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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ROBERT C. LARGE, 
Applicant/Appellant, 
vs. 
HOWARD TRUCKING OF UTAH 
INC., and/or STATE 
INSURANCE FUND, and 
THE SECOND INJURY FUND, 
Defendants/Respondent. 
BRIEF OF THE APPELLANT 
Appeal from the Industrial Commission of Utah 
Administrative Law Judge Richard G. Sumsion 
I. STATEMENT SHOWING JURISDICTION OF COURT OF APPEALS 
The Statutory authority granting jurisdiction to 
the Utah Court of Appeals is Utah Code Annotated Section 
78-2a-3(a). Also, the former Utah Code Annotated Section 
35-1-83 (repealed) and the current Utah Code Annotated 
Section 25-1-36 confer authority and jurisdiction on the 
Utah Court of Appeals. 
II. STATEMENT SHOWING NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS. These 
proceedings are brought to review a Worker's Compensation 
award entered on July 28, 1987, by Administrative Law 
Judge, Richard G. Sumsion, of the Industrial Commission of 
Utah. Appellant specifically appeals the July 28, 1987, 
Order denying a permanent total disability award. 
Case No. 370437-CA 
Priority Classification 
No. 6 
III. STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL, The 
Appellant raises tne following issues on appeal: 
1. Can a person be an "employee" for purposes of 
temporary total disability compensation, permanent partial 
disability compensation, and medical expense compensation, 
but not foi permanent total disability compensation? 
2. Must the industrial injury be zhe "primary 
cause" of Appellant's permanent total disability in cases 
where the industrial injury aggravated pre-eicisting 
impairment as defined in Utah Code Annotated 
Section 35-1-69? 
3. Is an award for permanent total disability 
based on an employee's wage earning capacity? 
4. Did Appellant present a prima facte case of 
tentative permanent total disability? 
IV. DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES 
AND ORDINANCES 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-16 (l)(b)-
Powers and duties of commission/fees. 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-45 - Compensa-
tion for industrial accidents to be paid. 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-67 - Permanent 
total disability - Amount of payments - Vocational 
Rehabilitation - Procedure and payments. 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-69 - Combined 
injuries resulting in permanent Incapacity -
Payment out of Second Injury Fund - Training of 
employees. 
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Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-82.53 - (Effec-
tive through December 31, 1987). Review of order 
of administrative law judge or commission - Effect 
of supplemental order of administrative law judge. 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-82.55 - (Effec-
tive through December 31, 1987). Motion for review 
- Writing required - Filing. 
•Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-83 - (Effective 
through December 31, 1987). Review by Court of 
Appeals. 
V. STATEMENT OF THE CASE. 
A. Nature of the Case. The Appellant claims that 
the July 23, 1987, Order denying Appellant's claim for 
permanent total disability under Worker's Compensation was 
contrary to law. 
B. Course of Proceedings. These proceedings 
began when Robert C. Large filed an Application for Hearing 
with the Industrial Commission of Utah on August 30, 1985, 
wherein he claimed permanent partial disability, temporary 
total disability, and medical benefits. The claim was 
heard before the Administrative Law Judge Richard G. 
Sumsion on April 22, 1986, and during the hearing, Judge 
Sums ion allowed the claim to be amended alleging permanent 
total disability. The main issue at the time of the 
hearing was whether Robert Large was entitled to Worker's 
Compensation Benefits since he was injured during a try-out 
period while performing a mandatory test drive as a 
prerequisite to employment with Howard Trucking of Utah, 
Inc. On September 3, 1986, Judge Sumsion found and ordered 
3 
that Robert Large was in fact entitled to Worker's Compen-
sation benefits and awarded him temporary total disability 
compensation and medical expenses, but reserved the issues 
of permanent partial and permanent total disability until a 
later determination. None of the parties sought review or 
appeal of the September 3, 1936, Order, and it became final 
on September 18, 1336. 
Cn April 17, 1987, Plaintiff requested a hearing 
for a permanent total disability determination. On July 
23, 1937, Judge Sumsion sent his Supplemental Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order wherein he stated the 
hearing for permanent total disability was unnecessary and 
denied permanent total disability and ordered a 10% 
permanent partial disability award. 
Plaintiff requested review by the Industrial 
Commission of Judge Sumsion1s July 28, 1987, Order, and the 
Motion for Review of Order was denied on September 9, 1987. 
Mr. Large now appeals the July 28, 1987, Order. 
C. Disposition at Administrative Agency. The 
Administrative Law Judge ruled that Robert Large was not 
entitled to permanent total disability on the premises that 
1) he was "in fact a non-employee", and 2) that the 
accident was not the proximate cause of Plaintiff's 
permanent total disability. 
The Industrial Commission denied Plaintiff's Motion 
for Review. 
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D. Relevant Facts. In mid-March 1985, Appellant 
called Defendant Howard Trucking to apply for a position as 
a semi-truck driver. He was told that he was welcome to 
apply but that they did no hiring over the phone. He was 
asked to apply in person and to bring a current chauffeur's 
license and current medical clearance. Appellant discussed 
the fact that he was a very large man with Mr. Howard of 
Howard Trucking to determine if this would disqualify him 
from obtaining a position. He was told that his good 
driving record was of far more importance than his physical 
size. (Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order of 
September 3, 1986, Pg. 2). 
On March 25, 1985, Appellant presented himself at 
Howard Trucking with a current physical clearance from a 
qualified physician in order to be tested for the position. 
Part of the application for employment involved taking a 
driver's test in a truck similar to the one that he might 
be driving. Such a test is required by ICC regulations and 
is administered by the employer. (Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, and Order, Pg. 2). After beginning the 
driving test, he was instructed to climb out of the truck, 
at which time his foot slipped and he fell approximately 
four and a half feet to the ground, injuring his back. 
(Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order, Pg. 3). 
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E. Other Relevant Facts. Appellant had been a 
truck driver for approximately 40 years prior to the 
industrial accident (Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law 
and Order, September 3, 1986, Pg. 2). 
He last worked as a truck driver in September 1982, 
and from that time until the industrial accident of March 
25, 1935, he was involved in self-employment activities. 
(Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order, September 
3, 1936, Pg. 2). 
Counsel for Appellant submitted a memorandum of law 
supporting the proposition that Worker's Compensation 
coverage should be extended to one injured during try-out 
period, and Judge agreed with rationale submitted. (Find-
ings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order, Pg. 3).. 
During the 10 years prior to the hearing date 
Appellant's average weight had been 325. (Transcript of 
Hearing, April 22, 1986, Pg. 42). 
Appellant had a pre-existing back condition at the 
time of his injury on March 25, 1985, as described by Judge 
Sumsion: 
"Dr. Barbosa assigned the applicant a 10% permanent 
physical impairment rating with 5% being attributed 
to the applicant's accident of March 25, 1985, and 
the remaining 5% being attributable to his previous 
lumbar surgery performed in 1953." (Supplemental 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order, 
July 28, 1987, Pg. 2). 
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Appellant had a limited educational background. 
(Supplemental Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and 
Order, July 28, 1987, Pg. 1). 
Appellant was 61 years of age at the time of his 
injury on March 25, 1935. (Findings of Fact, Conclusions 
of Law and Order, September 3, 1336, Pg. 2). 
VI. SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT. 
Judge Sums ion's two principle reasons for denying 
Robert Large permanent total disability are 1) that he is 
really a ?tnon-employee", for total disability purposes and 
so far as he knows, "an award of permanent total disability 
to one who is technically a non-employee is unprecedented 
in this state or in any other jurisdiction/1 and 2) that 
the "proximate cause(s)" of his disability are his age, 
lack of education, lack of transferable skills and pre-
existing physical conditions. 
Judge Sumsion ruled on September 3, 1986, that 
Robert Large's injury was a work-related injury covered 
under the Utah Workers Compensation Act, and ordered 
medical and temporary total disability benefits. Implicit 
in that Order was the finding that Robert Large was an 
"employee" for purposes of compensation. That Order became 
final and non-appealable on September 18, 1986. 
A worker cannot be an employee for purposes of 
medical expense benefits and temporary total disability 
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compensation, and yet not be an employee for purposes of 
permanent total disability benefits. 
The industrial injury was the direct and immediate 
cause of the permanent total disability Appellant now 
suffers. Furthermore, the injuries which he sustained 
aggravated his pre-existing condition and left with him 
with a disability which was substantially greater than he 
had, had he not sustained the injury of March 25, 1935. A 
decision and award for permanent total disability must be 
based on a plethora of facts, only one of which must be 
physical impairment. The Commission is obligated to 
consider Mr. Large's disability and must consider all 
factors leading to that disability. 
Appellant is entitled to permanent total disability 
benefits insured under the Worker's Compensation Laws 
because he fills all statutory requirements for permanent 
and total disability. The Administrative Law Judge's Order 
is inconsistent with his own findings. 
VII. ARGUMENT. 
POINT ONE: THE ISSUE AS TO WHETHER ROBERT LARGE WAS AN 
EMPLOYEE, EVEN THOUGH HE WAS INJURED DURING A 
TRY-OUT PERIOD, WAS ALREADY DECIDED, ENTERED, 
AND FINALIZED ON SEPTEMBER 18, 1986. 
At the beginning of the Worker's Compensation 
hearing held before Judge Richard G. Sumsion on April 22, 
1986, Judge Sumsion stated: 
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"It appears from a review of the file that 
the primary issue involved in this case is 
to determine whether or not the Appellant 
is entitled to the status of an employee 
inasmuch as he was injured by undergoing a 
test as a pre-employment requirement for 
the job; and if we get over that problem, 
then I assume there will be additional 
medical issues as well.'1 (Transcript of 
Hearing, April 22, 1986, Pg. 3, lines 10-
16) . 
In his following Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law, and Order of September 3, 1986, Judge Sumsion "got 
over that problem" and awarded Appellant temporary total 
compensation and medical benefits compensation. 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-45, states in its 
pertinent parts: 
"Every employee...who is injured...by accident 
arising out of or in the course of his employment... shall 
be paid compensation for loss sustained on account of the 
injury..." 
Judge Sumsion's order awarding Robert Large 
compensation for his injuries includes an implied finding 
that he was an "employee", within the meaning of the 
statute, with all the rights of someone who is injured by 
accident arising out of or in the course of his accident. 
Page 6 of the September 3, 1986, Order states: 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review of 
the foregoing shall be filed in writing within 
fifteen (15) days of the date hereof, specifying in 
detail the particular errors and objections, and, 
unless so filed, this Order shall be final and not 
subject to review or appeal. 
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This Order is in compliance with Utah Code Annotated 
Section 35-1-82.53, Section 35-1-82.55, and 35-1-83, all 
effective until January 1, 1988, which deny appellate 
review unless a timely Motion for Review of the Order is 
made. No Motion for Review or Objection was ever filed 
regarding this Order and therefore it became final on 
September 18, 1986. 
Appellant contends that the Administrative Law 
Judge's denial of permanent total disability benefits is 
inconsistent with the prior Order. A renewed discussion of 
"whether or not the Appellant is entitled to the status of 
an employee" for purposes of permanent total disability 
benefits (from the Supplemental Findings of Fact, Con-
clusions of Law and Order of July 28, 1987) is inappro-
priate. 
POINT TWO: IT IS INCONSISTENT FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
JUDGE AND INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION TO INCLUDE 
APPELLANT AS AN EMPLOYEE FOR PERMANENT PARTIAL 
DISABILITY BENEFITS, TEMPORARY TOTAL DIS-
ABILITY BENEFITS AND MEDICAL EXPENSES, BUT 
EXCLUDE HIM AS AN EMPLOYEE FOR PERMANENT TOTAL 
DISABILITY BENEFITS. 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-16(1)(b) Powers 
and duties of Commission - Fees, states the following: 
It shall be the duty of the commission, and it 
shall have full power, jurisdiction, and 
authority: 
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b) to ascertain and fix reasonable standards, and 
prescribe, modify, and enforce reasonable orders, 
for the adoption of safety devices, safeguards, and 
other means or methods of protection, to be as 
nearly uniform as possible, as necessary to carry 
out all laws and lawful orders relative to the 
protection of the life, health, safety, and welfare 
of employees in employment and places of employ-
ment; [underline added]. 
In Judge Sumsion's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law, and Order of September 3, 1986, he agreed with the 
rationale presented by Appellant at the hearing, that the 
scope of one's employment can be extended to those injured 
in a try-cut period. The Judge interpreted the Worker's 
Compensation Laws as they were meant to be: liberally and 
in favor of the applicant. The purpose is to protect 
injured employees from bearing the responsibility of paying 
for injuries that were work related. In entering his 
September 3, 1986, Order, the Administrative Law Judge 
prescribed a fair and reasonable standard and awarded the 
employee total temporary disability compensation, and 
medical benefits. The Administrative Law Judge later also 
awarded the employee permanent partial disability benefits. 
However, when the Administrative Law Judge and the Commis-
sion disallowed Appellant's claim for permanent total dis-
ability by arguing that he was in fact a "non-employee", 
their orders were not uniform and consistent with the 
previous decision and do not conform with the Judge's 
initial findings. Judge Sumsion himself calls his denial 
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"inconsistent" and is clearly troubled by its inconsis-
tency. 
Appellant asserts that it is the duty of the 
Commission to ascertain and fix certain standards and must 
carry out and uphold those standards. To apply different 
standards is inconsistent and "paradoxical". 
POINT THREE: THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE'S ARGUMENT THAT 
THE INDUSTRIAL INJURY IS NOT THE PROXIMATE 
CAUSE OF APPELLANT'S PERMANENT TOTAL DIS-
ABILITY IS UNNECESSARY AND MISLEADING. 
Judge Sumsion's Conclusion in his Supplemental 
Order of July 28, 1937, is that the proximate or dominant 
cause of the Appellant's present unemployability is not the 
industrial accident. He argues that "the causes that are 
merely incidental or instruments of a superior or con-
trolling agency are not the proximate causes and the 
responsible ones, though they may be the nearer in time tc 
the result." 
Proximate cause means nothing more than the legal 
cause after consideration of all the relevant circum-
stances. Bennion v. LeGrand Johnson Construction C., 701 
P.2d 1073 (Utah 1985). In the Worker's Compensation 
context, the legal cause is dictated by statute and by 
caselaw interpreting the statute. 
Proximate or dominant cause is not a criteria 
established in the statute required in awarding permanent 
total disability. Utah Code Annotated Section 35-1-67 
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simply reads, "In cases of permanent total disability." 
At no point does the statute mention or describe the need 
for the industrial injury to be the dominant cause of the 
permanent total disability. This argument was already 
attempted but reversed by the Supreme Court in Marshall v. 
Ind. Comm. cf Utah, 681 P.2d 203 (Utah 1984), wherein the 
Administrative Law Judge denied claim for permanent total 
disability because, 'it appears to the Administrative Law 
Judge that [the appellant's] prime reason for being un-
employed at the present time is age rather than physical 
impairment.f 
There are no "prime factor or reason" or "proximate 
cause" requirements in Utah Code Annotated Section 35-1-67. 
Judge Sumsion confronted the issue of Mr. Large's 
pre-existing problems; he states, "But for his pre-existing 
back condition, his obesity and his advanced years, it is 
highly unlikely he would have sustained any significant 
injury as result of the incident described." The Judge was 
struggling with the concept of "substantially greater" dis-
ability which is defined and discussed in Utah Code 
Annotated, Section 35-1-69. However, this statute clearly 
allows for compensation on the basis of two tests 1) 
"permanent incapacity which is substantially greater than 
he would have incurred if he had not had the pre-existing 
incapacity, or" 2) an injury "which aggravates or is 
aggravated by such pre-existing incapacity... ." 
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POINT FOUR: THE APPROPRIATE TEST IS NOT WHETHER THE INJURY 
WAS THE "PROXIMATE CAUSE" OF APPELLANT'S 
DISABILITY, BUT WHETHER THE INJURY "AGGRA-
VATED" HIS PRE-EXISTING PROBLEMS. 
Robert Large, like many applicants for worker's 
Compensation benefits, suffered from pre-existing problems. 
The issue is: to what extent do the pre-existing problems 
and the industrial injury contribute to the disability? In 
other words, what caused the new disability? Judge Sumsion 
approached the issue by discussing "proximate cause." 
The statute avoids the test of "proximate cause" by 
providing simply that: 
If any employee who has previously incurred a 
permanent incapacity by accidental injury, disease 
or congenital causes, sustains an industrial injury 
for which either compensation or medical care, or 
both, is provided by this chapter that results in 
permanent incapacity which is substantially greater 
than he would have incurred if he had not had the 
pre-existing incapacity, or which aggravates or is 
aggravated by such pre-existing incapacity, compen-
sation. .. shall be awarded on the basis of the 
combined injuries. ... 
Utah Code Ann. Section 35-1-69(1). 
The code further states that a disability which 
results from "any aggravation of the pre-existing injury 
shall be deemed "substantially greater." Utah Code An-
notated Section 35-1-69(1). 
In the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and 
Order of September 3, 1986, the Judge acknowledged that the 
medical records substantiated an aggravation: 
"The various medical reports are highly 
suggestive of some residual impairment from the 
applicant's industrial accident and they clearly 
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indicate extensive pre-existing impairment from 
prior back problems. The applicant underwent a 
three level laminectomy in 1953, and the current 
evidence of arthrosis and advance facet arthritis 
throughout the lumbar segment are probably attri-
butable to his old injury and the deterioration 
which would be expected to result therefrom. No 
definitive information is available as to the 
possibility of permanent impairment resulting from 
the industrial accident but Dr. Barbosa is of the 
opinion that the accident did aggravate the pre-
existing condition and he believes some residual 
impairment did result." (Findings of Fact, Con-
clusions of Law and Order, Pg. 4). 
Judge Sumsion found that the Appellant did sustain a 10% 
physical impairment, of which 5% is attributed to the 
Appellant's accident of March 25, 1985, and the remaining 
5'is being attributable to his pre-existing condition. 
(Supplemental Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and 
Crier, Pg. 7). Therefore, the rationale that the in-
dustrial injury contributed "relatively little" or in other 
words did not leave Appellant with a substantially greater 
injury, is inappropriate. Because the industrial injury 
aggravated his pre-existing problems, the statute deems the 
disability substantially greater. 
POINT FIVE: A DETERMINATION OF PERMANENT TOTAL DISABILITY 
MUST FOCUS ON APPELLANT'S LOSS OF WAGE EARNING 
CAPACITY. 
Once an injury is found to be compensable, the 
amount of recovery is governed by statute and case law. 
The injury which Mr. Large sustained has been found to be 
compensable. The next issue in the chain of permanent 
total disability determination is Mr. Large1s "present and 
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future ability to engage in gainful activity as it is 
effected by such diverse factors as age, sex, education, 
economic and social environment, in addition to the 
definite medical factor - permanent impairment.' Norton v. 
Industrial Commission, 723 P.2d 1025, (Utah 1936). 
"Disability in terms of worker's compensation is 
the worker's impairment of earning capacity.'' Hardman v. 
Salt Lake City Fleet Management, 725 P.2d 1323 (Utah 1936); 
Northwest Carrier v. Industrial. Comm., Etc., 639 P.2d 133, 
(Utah 1981) . 
A worker may be found permanently totally disabled 
if, by reason of the impairment from his injury, along with 
other factors, he cannot earn a substantial living on his 
own capabilities. Hardman, supra. 
Appellant had a work related injury, and the Admin-
istrative Law Judge concedes that the Appellant falls into 
the "odd-lot category" of injured workers who are unemploy-
able because of limited educational background and age. 
(Supplemental Findings cf Fact, Conclusions of Law, and 
Order, Pg. 1 and Pg.7). He also found that the industrial 
accident was the "immediate cause" of the applicant's back 
pain. (Supplemental Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, 
and Order, Pg. 6) The Administrative Law Judge also 
adopted the physician's report giving Mr. Large a 10% 
disability rating; 5% pre-existing and 5% due to the 
industrial accident. (Supplemental Findings of Fact, 
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Conclusions of Law, and Order, Pg. 7) Also, Mr. Large was 
obese and 61 years old at the time of the injury. 
In judging whether Mr. Large was entitled to 
permanent total disability, the Administrative Law Judge 
first had to find that the injury was work-related, (which, 
based on his first Order, it was), and then had to consider 
all relevant facts as to Mr. Large!s abilities to earn a 
living. In Norton the Court found, 
In assessing the lack of earning capacity, 
a constellation of factors must be con-
sidered, only one of which is physical 
impairment. Other factors are age, 
education, training and mental capacities. 
The Court in Norton reversed the Industrial Commission's 
order due to the fact that there was no consideration or 
mention of Norton's "eligibility for rehabilitation." 
Mr. Large's chances for rehabilitation were never 
addressed, and the Judge "acknowledges that the applicant 
most likely is unemployable due to a combination of factors 
..." (Order Denying Motion for Review, Pg. 1) His future 
earnings cannot be dependant upon his own capabilities. 
Appellant admits that his obesity and age play an 
extended role in his total disability. Nevertheless, 
Appellant also contends that the industrial injury of March 
25, 1985, played the greater role in leading to his per-
manent and total disability. Mr. Large testified at the 
hearing that he was 62 years old and weighed approximately 
376 pounds at the time of the injury. His average weight 
had been nearly the same for at least the 10 years prior to 
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the injury. Mr. Large1s testimony also included the fact 
that he had been a truck driver for approximately 40 years 
prior to March 25, 1985. Therefore, at least 10 years 
prior to the industrial injury, Mr. Large had been able to 
work competently despite his weight and previous back 
surgery and conditions from 1953. The industrial injury of 
March 25, 1935, took the last of his capabilities away and 
finally left him permanently and totally incapable of 
earning a wage. 
Mr. Large asserts that he "cannot perform work of 
the general character he was performing when injured, or 
any other work which a man of his capabilities1 may learn 
to do." (Marshall, see supra). 
POINT SIX: APPELLANT PRESENTED A PRIMA FACIE CASE OF 
PERMANENT TOTAL DISABILITY TO THE COMMISSION. 
From the initial hearing Judge Sumsion found that 
the Appellant was 62 years old, had relied on himself for 
the last 40 years to earn a living, that he had been rated 
as having a 10% whole man disability (supplemental Findings 
of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order, Pg. 2), and had a 
limited educational background (Supplemental Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order, pg. 1). By offering 
these facts into evidence, the Appellant presented a prima 
facie case of tentative permanent total disability. In 
Hardin an, the employee presented similar facts and the 
Supreme Court of Utah found he had established a prima 
13 
facie case of tentative permanent total disability before 
the Industrial Commission. 
Based on the fact that Appellant proved a case of 
tentative permanent total disability along with the finding 
by Judge Sumsion that he is clearly within the "odd lot" 
class of workers, Appellant asserts he is entitled to 
permanent total disability as provided by the Worker's 
Compensation statutes. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
Appellant is entitled to permanent total disability 
and should be awarded such. He has met all statutory 
requirements and case law supports the issues presented en 
this appeal. 
Appellant sustained a work-related injury for which 
he received temporary total compensation, permanent partial 
disability and medical benefits. He sustained a physical 
impairment through an injury which aggravated his pre-
existing medical problems, which combined with his pre-
existing condition, his age, limited work and educational 
experience, has left him with a substantially greater 
disability which completely prevents him from earning a 
reasonable income. 
The Administrative Law Judge and Commission's 
ruling that Appellant was in fact a "non-employee" and that 
the injury of March 25, 1985 was not the "proximate" or 
19 
"dominant cause" of his disability, should not stand. 
Appellant was an employee and there is no requirement, 
either in the Worker's compensation statutes or in case 
law, that an industrial injury be the dominant cause of the 
disability. By statutory definitation, an industrial 
injury which aggravates a pre-existing medical condition is 
compensable. 
Appellant respectfully prays that the Order of July 
28, 1987, be reversed and remanded for an award of per-
manent total disability compensation. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this day of January, 
1S3S. 
HELGE3EN & WATERFALL 
JApC n. /KELGESEN 
Attorney/for Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF THE APPELLANT, postage 
prepaid this 9 7 ^ day of January, 1983 to the following: 
Burton K. 3rasher 
WORKERS COMPENSATION 
560 S. 300 E. 
Salt Lake City, Ut 84145 
Erie Boorman 
SECOND INJURY FUND 
160 E. 300 S. 
salt Lake City, UT 84111 
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ADDENDUM 
U.C.A. 35-1-16 Powers and duties of the commission 
- Fees. 
Exhibit 2: 
U.C.A. 35-1-45 Compensation for industrial acci-
dents to be paid. 
Exhibit 3: 
U.C.A. 35-1-67 Permanent total disability - Amount 
of payments - Vocational rehabilita-
tion, Procedure and payments. 
Exhibit 4: 
U.C.A. 35-1-69 Combined injuries resulting in 
permanent incapacity - Payment out 
of Second Injury Fund - Training of 
employee. 
Exhibit 5: 
U.C.A. 35-1-82.53 Reconsideration of order of adminis-
trative law judge or commission-
Effect of supplemental order of 
administrative law judge. 
Exhibit 6: 
U.C.A. 35-1-82.55 Motion for review - Writing required 
- Filing. 
Exhibit 7: 
U.C.A. 35-1-83 Review by Court of Appeals. 
35-1-16. Powers and duties of commission -
Fees. 
(1) It shall be the duty of the commission, and it 
shall have full power, jurisdiction, and authority: 
(b) to ascertain and fix reasonable standards, 
and prescribe, modify, and enforce reasonable 
orders, for the adoption of safety devices, safegu-
ards, and other means or methods of protection, to 
be as nearly uniform as possible, as necessary to 
carry out all laws and lawful orders relative to the 
protection of the life, health, safety, and welfare of 
employees in employment and places of employ-
ment; 
35-1-45. Compensation for industrial accidents to 
be paid. 
Every employee mentioned in Section 35-1-43 
who is injured, and the dependents of every such 
employee who is killed, by accident arising out of or 
in the course of his employment, wherever such 
injury occurred, if the accident was not purposely 
self-inflicted, shall be paid compensation for loss 
sustained on account of the injury or death, and 
such amount for medical, nurse, and hospital serv-
ices and medicines, and, in case of death, such 
amount of funeral expenses, as provided in this 
chapter. The responsibility for compensation and 
payment of medical, nursing, and hospital services 
and medicines, and funeral expenses provided under 
this chapter shall be on the employer and its insur-
ance carrier and not on the employee. itu 
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35-147. Permanent total disability - Amount of 
payments - Vocational rehabilitation • 
Procedure and payments. 
in cases of permanent total disability the empl-
oyee shall receive 66 2/3% of his average weekly 
wages at the time of the injury, but not more than a 
maximum of 85% of the state average weekly wage 
at the time of the injury per week and not less than 
a minimum of $45 per week plus $5 for a dependent 
spouse and $5 for each dependent minor child under 
the age of 18 years, up to a maximum of four dep-
endent minor children not to exceed the average 
weekly wage of the employee at the time of the 
\njury, but not to exceed 85% of the state average 
weekly wage at the time of the injury per week. 
However, in no case of permanent total disability 
shall the employer or its'insurance carrier be requ-
ired to pay weekly compensation payments for more 
than 312 weeks. A finding by the commission of 
permanent total disability shall in all cases be tent-
ative and not final until such time as the following 
proceedings have been had: If the employee has 
tentatively been found to be permanently and totally 
disabled, it shall be mandatory that the industrial 
commission of Utah refer the employee to the divi-
sion of vocational rehabilitation under the state 
board of education for rehabilitation training and it 
shall be the duty of the commission to order paid to 
the vocational rehabilitation division, out of the 
second injury fund provided for by Subsection 35-
1-68(1), not to exceed $1,000 for use in the reha-
bilitation and training of the employee; the rehabi-
litation and training of the employee shall generally 
follow the practice applicable under Section 35-1-
69, relating to the rehabilitation of employees 
having combined injuries. If the division of vocati-
onal rehabilitation under the state board of educa-
tion certifies to the industrial commission of Utah in 
writing that the employee has fully cooperated with 
the division of vocational rehabilitation in its efforts 
to rehabilitate him, and in the opinion of the divi-
sion the employee may not be rehabilitated, the 
commission shall order that there be paid to the 
employee weekly benefits at the rate of 66 2/3% of 
his average weekly wages at the time of the injury, 
but not more than a maximum of 85% of the state 
average weekly wage at the time of the injury per 
week and not less than a minimum of $45 per week 
plus $5 for a dependent spouse and $5 for each 
dependent minor child under the age of 18 years, up 
to a maximum of four dependent minor children not 
to exceed the average weekly wage of the employee 
at the time of the injury, but not to exceed 85% of 
the state average weekly wage at the time of the 
injury per week out of the second injury fund pro-
vided for by Subsection 35-1-68(1), for such 
period of time beginning with the time that the 
payments,as in this section provided, to be made by 
the employer or its insurance carrier terminate and 
ending with the death of the employee. No employee 
shall be entitled to any such benefits if he fails or 
refuses to cooperate with the division of vocational 
rehabilitation under this section. ^ 
All persons who are permanently and totally dis-
abled and entitled to benefits from the second injury 
fund under Subsection 35-1-68(1), including those 
injured prior to March 6, 1949, shall receive not less 
than $120 per week when paid only by the second 
injury fund, or when combined with compensation 
payments of the employer or the insurance carrier. 
The division of vocational rehabilitation shall, at the 
termination of the vocational training of the empl-
oyee, certify to the industrial commission of Utah 
the work the employee is qualified to perform, and 
thereupon the commission shall, after notice to the 
employer and an opportunity to be heard, determine 
whether the employee has, notwithstanding such 
rehabilitation, sustained a loss of bodily function. 
The loss or permanent and complete loss of use of 
both hands or both arms, or both feet or both legs, 
or both eyes, or of any two thereof, constitutes total 
and permanent disability, to be compensated acco-
rding to the provisions of this section and no tent-
ative finding of permanent total disability is requ-
ired in those instances. In all other cases where there 
has been rehabilitation effected but where there is 
some loss of bodily function, the award shall be 
based upon partial permanent disability. 
In no case shall the employer or the insurance 
carrier be required to pay compensation for any 
combination of disabilities of any kind as provided 
in Sections 35-1-65, 35-1-66 and this section, 
including loss of function, in excess of 85% of the 
state average weekly wage at the time of the injury 
per week for 312 weeks. uts 
35-1-69. CoMbiaed lajtrks retailing in 
ptrwuwtwi l*eap*rity - Payment out of Second 
UJary Faad - Trailing of employee. 
(1) if any employee who has previously incurred a 
permanent incapacity by accidental injury, disease, 
or congenital causes, sustains an industrial injury 
for which either compensation or medical care, or 
both, is provided by this chapter that results in 
permanent incapacity which is substantially greater 
than he would have incurred if he had not had the 
pre-existing incapacity, or which aggravates or is 
aggravated by such pre-existing incapacity, comp-
ensation, medical care, and other related items as 
outlined in Section 35-1-81, shall be awarded on 
the basis of the combined injuries, but the liability 
of the employer for such compensation, medical 
care, and other related items shall be for the indus-
trial injury only. The remainder shall be paid out of 
the Second Injury Fund provided for in Subsection 
35-1-68(1), and shall be determined after assig-
ning the impairment for the industrial injury on a 
whole person uncombined basis and then deducting 
this percentage from the total combined rating. This 
combined impairment rating may not exceed lOO t^. 
For purposes of this section, (a) any aggravation 
of a pre-existing injury, disease, or congenital 
cause shall be deemed 'substantially greater", and 
compensation, medical care, and other related items 
shall be awarded on the basis of the combined inj-
uries as provided in this Subsection (1), and (b) 
where there is no such aggravation, no award for 
combined injuries may be made unless the percen-
tage of permanent physical impair mem attributable 
to the industrial injury is \0V% or greater and the 
percentage of permanent physical impairment resu-
lting from all causes and conditions, including the 
industrial injury, is greater than 20^t. In determi-
ning the impairment thresholds and assessment of 
liability in favor of the employee and appoitionment 
between the carrier or employer and the Second 
Injury Fund, the permanent physical impairment 
attributable to the industrial injury or the pre-
existing condition or overall impairment, shall be 
considered on a whole person uncombined basis. If 
the pre-existing incapacity referred to in this Sub-
section (1Kb) previously has been compensated for, 
in whole or in part, as a permanent panial disability 
under this chapter or Chapter 2, Title 35. the Utah 
Occupational Disease Disability Law, such compe-
nsation shall be deducted from the liability assessed 
to the Second Injury Fund under this paragraph. 
If the payment of temporary disability benefits, 
medical expenses, or other related items are required 
as a result of the industrial injury subject to this 
section, the employer or its insurance carrier shall be 
responsible for all such temporary benefits, medical 
care, or other related items up to the end of the 
period of temporary total disability resulting from 
the industrial injury. Any allocation of disability 
benefits, medical care, or other related items follo-
wing such period shall be made between the empl-
oyer or its insurer and the Second Injury Fund as 
provided for in this section, and any payments made 
by the employer or its insurance carrier in excess of 
its proportionate share shall be recoverable at the 
time of the award for combined disabilities tf any is 
made. 
A medical panel having the qualifications of the 
medical panel set forth in Sewtion 35-2-56, shall 
review all medical aspects of the case and determine 
first, the total permanent physical impairment res-
ulting from all causes and conditions including the 
industrial injury; second, the percentage of perma-
nent physical impairment attnbutable to the indus-
trial injury; and third, the percentage of permanent 
physical impairment attributable to the previously 
existing condition, whether due to accidental injury, 
disease, or congenital causes. The Industrial Com-
mission shall then assess the liability for permanent 
partial disability compensation and future medical 
care to the employer on the basis of the percentage 
of permanent physical impairment attributable to 
the industrial injury only and any amounts remai-
ning to be paid shall be payable out of the Second 
Injury Fund. Medical expenses shall be paid in the 
first instance by the employer or its insurance 
carrier. Amounts, if any, which have been paid by 
the employer in excess of the portion attributable to 
the industrial injury shall be reimbursed to the 
employer out of the Second Injury Fund upon 
written request and verification of amounts so exp-
ended. 
(2) The commission may increase the weekly 
compensation rates to be paid out of this special 
fund. This increase shall be used for the rehabilita-
tion and training of any employee coming under this 
chapter as may be certified to the commission by the 
Rehabilitation Department of the State Board of 
Education as being eligible for rehabilitation and 
training. There may not be paid out of such special 
fund for rehabilitation an amount in excess of 
SI, 000. i«4 
35-142.53. (Effective through December 31, 
1M7). Review of order of administrative law 
jadge or commission - Effect of supplemental 
order of administrative law judge. 
(1) Any party in interest who is dissatisfied with 
the order entered by an administrative law judge or 
the commission may file a motion for review of 
such order. Upon the filing of such motion to 
review his order the administrative law judge may 
(a) reopen the case and enter a supplemental order 
after holding such further hearing and receiving 
such further evidence as he may deem necessary; or 
(b) amend or modify his prior order by a supplem-
ental order; or (c) refer the entire case to the com-
mission. If the administrative law judge makes a 
supplemental order, as provided above, it shall be 
final unless a motion to review the same shall be 
filed with the commission. it7s 
35-I-&2.55. (Effective through December 31, 
1W7). Motion for review - Writing required -
FUiig. 
Every motion for review shall be in writing, and 
shall specify in detail the particular errors and obj-
ections. Such motion must be filed within fifteen 
days of the date of any order of the administrative 
law judge or commission unless further time is 
granted by the administrative law judge or commi-
ssion within fifteen days, and unless so filed, said 
order shall become the award of the commission 
and shall be final. ir?s 
tAniDii 
35-1-13. (Effective through Dtcenber 31, 1987). 
Review by Court of Appeal. 
Within 30 days after the commission has given 
notice of its award, provided a motion was previo-
usly filed in accordance with this act for review of 
the order or supplemental order upon which the 
award was based, any affected party, including the 
Division of Finance, may file an action in the Court 
of Appeals for review and determination of the 
lawfulness of the award. i*t 
